Lesson – Risk Mitigation – Safety and Security

Jun 12, 2019

Lesson – Risk Mitigation – Safety and Security

 

NOTICE: The goal of this post is for us, our family, to learn something from a tragic event and apply what we learn to reduce the risks of a similar incident happening to us. If you learn something from this post - great; if not, it's your loss, as we tried to spread the recommended precautions contain herein. The tragedy identified below really could have, or potentially in the future, happen to us; it almost did. It could happen to YOU --- it WILL definitely happen again to another.  We deeply sympathize with the family that suffered through the tragic event and nothing herein is written or intended to disparage them or be judgmental. The choices they made were theirs and theirs alone to make. What happened can’t be undone – you can either choose to learn something from it or not. If you who read this are of the type that can’t mentally handle truthful and honest discourse, differing opinions, freedom of choice, reality, or learning from adverse events – STOP reading and go elsewhere. For those of this mindset, truly, "Ignorance is bliss, 'Tis folly to be wise". (Thomas Gray's poem “Ode on a Distant Prospect of Eton College”)

 

The rational and prudent concept of reviewing incidents to increase situational awareness, modify strategies, minimize risks, and develop a comprehensive preparedness response plan is not of our origin, but emphasized on the Caribbean Safety and Security Net (CSSN) website under the heading FAQ Frequently Asked Questions - What is CSSN?  The CSSN motto “Know Before You Go” is well founded advice. As stated on their website they recommend the review of their documented incidents with an eye toward “what if this had happened to me? What would/should I have done, either before, during or after the event.” with the goal of developing a “well thought out, understood and agreed plan”.  They also provide lists of recommendations that minimize risks based on the unfortunate experiences of many cruisers on a web page titled, General Security Precautions for Cruisers. Many who take the time to review this information and act upon it, significantly improve their outcome when confronted under similar circumstances.  It should be mandatory reading for all cruisers. It is advised to follow the CSSN website links provided and READ THEM BEFORE continuing to read this post. As you continue to read this post, consider the potentially different outcomes if the people in the documented CSSN's incident reports, that suffered equally tragic events, had just took the time to read and heed their free advice and recommendations. Ask yourself why they did NOT know - is the sailing community informing cruisers adequately of the potential risks of this nature and how to minimize them? I'm of the opinion the answer to this question is - NO!!

 

 

My curiosity was raised when I read a 3 May 2019 New Zealand Herald news article on the internet that reported “Kiwi man Alan Culverwell shot dead by pirates on boat in Panama”. I glanced through the article and discovered his wife and one of his two children were also injured – what a horrific tragedy.  This tragedy had similarities of many such incidents we had reviewed before - a intended "stealth" theft escalated to assault and death due to a imprudent direct confrontation. What peaked my interest and I found strange, was the statement that the call for help/assistance was to New Zealand - an emergency call halfway around the world - I had not heard of this before.  I did a Goggle internet search and found very little more definitive information.  Checked the Caribbean Safety and Security Net website but no mention of the incident was listed yet.

I mentioned the incident to my wife and she inquired back - Could that have happen to us? She briefly mentioned our own very close call at Holiday Oceanview Marina (HOV), Samal Island, Mindanao, Philippines where a terrorists kidnapping occurred the night of our first day of arrival there on 21 September 2015. We had been assisted by the marina manager, Kjartan Sekkingstad (read his story), most of that late afternoon; he had hauled Indra out for us - we didn't know then it would be a very long time before we saw him again.  It was at my wife’s insistence that we left HOV marina at about 8 PM and stayed in a nearby hotel – it was a long day as we had drove about 10 hours from Surigao City, Mindanao to HOV marina the same day and our boat was still in a state of disarray. About three hours after we had left HOV marina for the hotel, the terrorist kidnapping incident occurred - eventually resulting in the death of two cruisers. We were very fortunate and "lucky".

This kidnapping incident was our "wake-up" call to develop our own security plan and to continually revise it based on current local/regional events and reviews of other reported unfortunate incidents. STOP, ask yourself: Are you prepared for a theft, burglary, assault, or boarding on your boat or intrusion into your land based home? What is it going to take for YOU to "wake-up" and recognize the real potential threats of crime we all face, whether on land or sea?

What follows next is a summary of what sources of information we use to increase our awareness and actions we have taken. We have included our Response Plan, which is continually revised, as an example for you to evaluate and modify as you see fit for your circumstances.

 

Information

 

Emergency Contacts/Equipment

  • We had purchased, registered, and installed a new Emergency Position-Indicating Radio Beacon (EPIRB). While an EPIRB is intended to send a distress call while at sea, it can also be a option to use while at anchorage if an adverse situation warrants it.
  • We had purchased and installed a new Very High Frequency (VHF) radio with Digital Selective Calling (DSC). DSC is essentially a automatic digitized distress call with GPS location and unique boat information that is sent with the press of a single radio button  - a "panic button".  A VHF DSC channel 70 distress call can only be received by DSC equipped stations that are monitored and within the approximate VHF 20 mile range.  In the Philippines, coastal stations and vessels equipped with DSC radios are limited but increasing - in 2018 the Philippine Coast Guard issued a procurement bid of 28 million pesos for DSC capable radio equipment.
  • The traditional VHF radio Mayday distress call on channel 16 also has a limited range of approximately 20 miles. After conversations and advice of some local Filipino Coast Guard members we modified the format of our Mayday distress call to include the word HELP in the local language/dialect. They explained that many locals that "might" have a VHF radio do not know or adhere to the traditional format of a Mayday distress call; but will likely understand and respond to a call for HELP in their local language. So at our current location the distress call announcement is: TABANG - TABANG - TABANG, MAYDAY - MAYDAY - MAYDAY. TABANG means HELP in the local Bisayan or Visayan languages.
  • A Icom IC-718 High Frequency (HF) All Band Transceiver is installed aboard but its operational status is still unknown. We do have a list of emergency frequencies but have yet to incorporate this into our response plan.
  • Satellite Communications - We do not have "yet". We are still evaluating and considering Inmarsat-based, Iridium-based, or Intelsat-based devices, but cost is still a factor.
  • Cell phone coverage and usage is extensive in the Philippines and expanding constantly. Just as we do at our land based dwelling, we maintain a list of emergency contact phone numbers aboard our boat. Our emergency contact phone number list aboard is prioritized by distance and capability - we call the closest authority to our location first for assistance and work down the list based on if contact is made. Our number of last resort, is the IMB PRC 24-hour Anti Piracy HELPLINE telephone number: + 60 3 2031 0014. This phone list takes very little extra effort to maintain and we make an effort to visit and chat with the local authorities - the interactions often results in new phone numbers and information on "activities" in the local area. We also research and designate the closest medical facility to our location - if something were to happen, we know were to go and how to get there beforehand. These contact numbers and the location of a medical facility should be standard items for each cruiser and discussed with local representatives when clearing into a country, port, or marina.

Boat Modifications

  • The wood hatches above the cabin and v-berth were reinforced with steel bars.
  • The cabin/v-berth door was reinforced and added three sections of removable wood cross bracing to make it almost impenetrable in the closed and locked position.
  • In the v-berth, added electrical wiring and outlets for cell phone and handheld VHF charging stations. When not in use these items are returned to this location.
  • Added a PA hailer horn midway up mast interfaced with the radio. The horn can emit navigational sounds, an assortment of siren sounds, or voice.
  • Added a AIS Class B transponder that turns on with radio power. A separate "off" switch was added to be used when warranted in "questionable" security areas.
  • Added a 12 VDC (8 joule /9,700 volts) electrical fence charger that electrifies only the top isolated lifeline bare wire; the lower lifeline bare wire is wired into the return/ground circuit which increases the likelihood of a discharge during a boarding attempt. It is activated by a manual or remote control switch and when on illuminates one white LED light in the cockpit and one forward of the mast. Three electric fence international warning signs are displayed on both sides of boat.
  • Retained our pyrotechnic distress flares for our Response Plan and as a boarding deterrent, despite being replaced by a Sirius Signal SOS Electronic Flare and Flag.

 

Note: The CSSN website reported the boarding of a boat near the Edinburgh channel, Nicaragua by 20-25 men aboard four pangas on 11 April 2019. The boat's 4 person crew had a viable response plan, previously modified and installed security bars that covered all hatches and companionways, and secured themselves safely inside and survived. However, the significant amount of damaged to their boat by a raiding mob of this size is not envisioned in our Response Plan and is under evaluation along with their identified shortfall in their inReach satellite communicator (no local emergency response). Their deficiency in this incident appears to be lack of convoy/buddy boating consideration and adequate offshore distance from a known hostile coast.

 

Response Plan - Noise Outside, Stay Inside, Scare Away, Avoid Confrontation

  • On deck equipment is stored in a pad locked lazerette, cabin, or locked in place with cables/chains and pad locks.
  • Outboard motor is stowed and double locked in place on the boomkin rail mount. Anti-theft Styrofoam pad with in-bedded razors attached.
  • Dingy is raised, set on foredeck, and locked to the deck cleat with chain and pad lock.
  • Razor thin and sharp, stainless steel wire with small treble hooks is strung from standing rigging to boat attach points (4 places on side decks). Very little contact pressure is needed to penetrate skin.
  • Companionway swing open doors and hatch are closed and barrel bolts inserted. Companionway wash boards inserted as local conditions warrant.
  • Both top deck hatches are secured at night at the 4-inch open position for ventilation or fully closed and locked.
  • Activate electrical lifeline barrier by switch at inside companionway entrance or remote control. Activation also illuminates two white LED lights, one in cockpit and one in front of mast.
  • Good Night - Noise is heard - intruders are suspected.
  • Wife joins daughter in v-berth. V-berth top deck hatch is fully closed and secured if partially open. Both v-berth port windows are closed if open.  V-berth door is closed, but not secured with barricade braces.
  • Wife uses cell phone and initiates calls according to prioritized emergency contact phone list.
  • All navigation and deck lights are switched ON - siren sound is activated at radio and broadcasted through PA hailer on mast. If intruders depart, list stops here.
  • Initiate VHF DSC distress call "panic" button. GPS position is also automatically sent by AIS when radio is turned on.
  • Cabin top deck hatch is fully closed and secured if partially open. All cabin port windows are closed if open.
  • Terminate siren sound and issue Help (local language) 3 times, Mayday 3 times, with distress message through PA hailer on mast, at least two times. Play "fake" response recording made by local Filipino Coast Guard friend that acknowledges distress call with our boat name and announces estimated arrival in about 10 minutes. (The intent is to alert and summon help from anyone in hearing range in the local area, whether a night fisherman or a local on land. This is also a scare tactic to let the intruders known a radio distress call for help has been made and "help is on the way".)
  • Issue actual voice distress call on VHF radio, multiple times. Reactivate siren sound through PA hailer on mast.
  • Activate EPIRB.
  • Fire rocket flare out cabin port window, on both starboard and port side.
  • If intruders are attempting to breach companionway entrance or cabin top deck hatch, join wife and daughter in v-berth. Close v-berth door, lock, and install wood barricade braces.
  • If intruders are in cabin and attempting to breach v-berth door, expend contents of large fire extinguisher into cabin through 1-inch hole at top of v-berth door.
  • If v-berth door appears to be compromised soon, grab three PFDs from hanging locker, put cell phone and VHF handheld radios in waterproof ditch bag, position wife and daughter underneath v-berth top deck hatch. Expend half of second fire extinguisher into cabin through 1-inch hole at top of v-berth door. Immediately pop open v-berth top deck hatch and exit - first the wife, next the daughter, then me. Proceed directly forward to bowsprit and go overboard - gather at and hold onto chain snubber line at bow waterline. Decide to stay put and hidden or swim to shore - stay together at all times.

 

So back to answering the wife's question from above: Could that happen to us? I responded back YES, in reality it could happen to anyone. I knew that was not what she wanted to hear, even though it is the cold hard truth. So, I added a caveat that in a similar situation the outcome for us most likely would be different. Why? Based on the very brief review of the single news article, the limited description of events revealed issues and actions that if handled differently could have changed the outcome. I deferred explaining further on the rationale that additional details should emerge over the next few weeks or so, as the internet and social media propagates this issue.  So I began critically monitoring, researching, and reading everything that appeared on the internet about the AQUA LOBO tragedy.

 

What the news and social media reported.

 

Reviewed many other news media reports, but in most cases they were the same articles, just copied and syndicated. Also reviewed many other social media sites and websites, but they revealed very little additional factual information.

 

The basic facts and events of the incident seem to be:

 

Incident Date/Time: 2 May 2019 prior to 01:05 AM local Panama time.

  • All the media reports were inconsistent on what time the incident occurred. The most reliable source appears to be the Media Statement for Rebecca and Steve Woledge on Nadine Taylor's Facebook which stated, "I can confirm that I took the initial sat phone call from Derryn Culverwell on Thursday 2 May at 6.05pm New Zealand time."
  • When the time was 01:05 AM on Thursday, May 2 in Panama, it was 06:05 PM, May 2 in New Zealand.
  • When the time was 01:05 AM on Thursday, May 2 in Panama, it was 06:05 in Coordinated Universal Time (UTC).
  • The International Maritime Bureau Piracy Reporting Centre (IMB PRC) and Inmarsat-C System Alert Message indicated notification of the incident at 07:30 UTC - about 1 1/2 hours after the incident occurred.

 

Location of Incident: (9.27150° N -78.12600° W or 09:16.40N –078:07.45W) Anchorage at Isla Mono, 2.5NM SE of San Ignacio De Tupile, Guna Yala, Panama.

  • All the media reports were inconsistent or blatantly wrong on the location of the incident. The most reliable source appears to be the IMB PRC Report 053-19, however the position appears to be approximate. The IMB PRC range/bearing of around 1.9NM ENE of San Ignacio De Tupile, Panama does not seem correct as it appears based on the Goggle location error of San Ignacio De Tupile. The corrected range/bearing should be around 2.5NM SE of San Ignacio De Tupile (red circle).
  • A check of the Active Captain website revealed the Isla Mono anchorage (red star) was “marked” and reviewed favorably by three other cruisers – latest review was in 2017. The Active Captain website does show the approximate correct location of San Ignacio De Tupile (red circle).
  • Many media sources designated this area as remote which is a questionable designation in current times; as remote implies an area very far from urban areas or lacks transportation links that are typical in more populated areas.  The public use Wannukandi Airport is only 1809 m (5934 ft) from the Isla Mono anchorage (red star). The urban community island of San Ignacio De Tupile with a population of about 1,450 is only 3.93 km (2.44 mi) from the Isla Mono anchorage.  The Playon Chico – Ukupseni community, one of the most populous islands in the Guna Yala territory with a population of about 3,000, and the Playón Chico Airport providing daily flights (less than an hour) to Panama City, is only about 12.6 km (7.85 mi) from the Isla Mono anchorage. Numerous hotels, hostels, resorts, and tourist destinations are identified on Goggle maps in relatively close (less than 10 miles) vicinity to the Isla Mono anchorage.

    Boat Details:

    • Name: AQUA LOBO
    • Make: 1996 60' Astrolabe Custom Raised Pilothouse Trawler. Walk through video of boat on YouTube.
    • MMSI: 319116300
    • Call Sign: ZGGM
    • Flag/Country of Registry: George Town, Cayman Islands
    • Equipment: Inventory and Details on Boaters Resources website (link deleted).
    • Like mono hulls or catamarans with sugar scoop sterns, AQUA LOBO has a stern swim platform that facilitates very easy access to the water - it equally provides very accessible access to any potential unwelcome visitors or boarders. Was unable to locate any information on the installation of anti-intrusion devices or alarms to mitigate this increased risk factor.

      Incident Details:

      • Trawler AQUA LOBO was anchored alone close to Isla Mono, on the evening of 1 May 2019. (IMB PRC Report 053-19)
      • Prior to 01:00 AM of 2 May 2019, three criminals swam out to AQUA LOBO and boarded with intent of committing theft. (El Siglo report 5 May 2019)
      • The perpetrators were hooded and equipped with knives/machetes and a shotgun. (MIDIARIO.com 2 May 2019) (Daily Mail Australia 4 May 2019)
      • Supposition: The perpetrators boarded AQUA LOBO's swim platform and climbed the external ladder (red arrow) to the flybridge where a dingy, outboard motor, and jet ski were located.
      • The family (husband, wife, and daughter) was woken up by a noise on the yacht's roof and went upstairs to check. (Daily Mail Australia 4 May 2019) "went upstairs" is assumed to mean they went up to the command bridge accessible internally by a stairway (red arrow) from the cabin areas.
      • The husband went out to investigate and was shot at close range with a shotgun and died. (New Zealand Herald 5 May 2019) "went out to investigate" is assumed to mean that the command bridge aft sliding windows/doors (red arrow) were opened and he exited out to the flybridge where the perpetrators were located.
      • The wife received a deep machete wound to her upper arm and shoulder during the attack and required 36 stitches. (RNZ website 7 May 2019)
      • The 11-year-old daughter suffered blows to her head and arm, thought to be from the machete handle. (RNZ website 7 May 2019)
      • The wife and daughter retreated down into the boat's lower cabin, joined her other child, and locked the cabin. (New Zealand Herald website 4 May 2019)
      • Derryn Hughes (Alan Culverwell's younger sister) stated, The wife didn't know what to do so she made an emergency call to close friends in Marlborough, Rebecca and Steve Woledge. (New Zealand's Stuff website 5 May 2019)
      • At 1:05 AM Panama local time, the wife made a emergency Satellite phone call to Rebecca Woledge in New Zealand (Thursday 2 May at 6.05pm New Zealand time). (Nadine Taylor's Facebook 5 May 2019)
      • The International Maritime Bureau Piracy Reporting Centre (IMB PRC) and Inmarsat-C System Alert Message indicated notification of the incident at 07:30 UTC (02:30 AM Panama local time) - about 1 1/2 hours after the incident occurred. (IMB PRC Report 053-19)
      • The IMB PRC immediately (07:30 UTC) informed the Panamanian authorities who dispatched a marine police patrol boat to the location to render assistance. (IMB PRC Report 053-19)
      • The IMB PRC continued to liaise with the Panamanian authorities and the family on the boat until the marine police boat arrived. (IMB PRC Report 053-19)
      • The wife and children were taken to receive initial medical attention at the San Ignacio De Tupile gym. (Midiario.com 3 May 2019) They were then taken to a hospital in Panama City. (New Zealand Herald website 4 May 2019)
      • The San Ignacio De Tupile community secretary, Javier Morris, stated the entire population (Guna Yala community of San Ignacio De Tupile) itself activated the alert which ultimately led to the capture of the suspects. (General Congress of Guna Yala 3 May 2019)
      • In the early morning of Friday 3 May 2019, three Guna Yala indigenous suspects were captured in the sector of San Ignacio de Tupile and were taken into the custody of police agents of the National Border Service (Senafront). (Midiario.com 3 May 2019)
      • Three Panamanian Guna Yala indigenous suspects, Leandro Herrera, Avelino Arosemen, and a third suspect, a minor, were charged in a courthouse in Colon, Panama. (The Guardian 5 May 2019)
      • On 8 May, trawler AQUA LOBO was relocated to Shelter Bay Marina, Panama by friends who had flown to Panama from New Zealand. (New Zealand Herald 8 May 2019) Picture below is AQUA LOBO's AIS/GPS track into Shelter Bay Marina from MarineTraffic website.

       

      Conclusion

      Based on the reported facts, the AQUA LOBO crew had not implemented adequate security/safety precautions and developed a well thought out, understood and agreed upon contingency response plan to minimize the risk of theft, burglary and assault as recommended by the Caribbean Safety and Security Net (CSSN). The CSSN advice, "To prevent a boarding incident from possible escalation to violence, the emphasis is placed on scaring off rather than confronting intruders." was not followed with tragic results.  Many other CSSN recommendations were also not adhered to: have a response plan ready to use if boarded; do NOT leave the safety of your secure interior and risk a violent encounter with unknown attackers; do not anchor alone; outboards are a major target: always lock them securely; install an alarm system or use portable alarms/lights to cover key access points, hardened security including impenetrable cabins, etc. These fact based precautions were recently reemphasized by a CSSN news post.

      Primary and backup emergency communication procedures need to be known beforehand and by all crew members.  A Satellite phone was onboard but not programed with a emergency distress contact number and a written down emergency distress contact number list was not available or known. Despite calling friends in New Zealand for assistance using a Satellite phone, it took over 1 1/2 hours after the incident occurred to contact the International Maritime Bureau Piracy reporting Centre (IMB PRC) and initiate a local emergency response. The IMB PRC has a manned 24-hour Anti Piracy HELPLINE telephone number: + 60 3 2031 0014, that if known beforehand could have been immediately utilized to request assistance.

       

      Other Observations

      Facebook Accounts

      • The online news media obtained pictures of the family from the Facebook accounts of the husband and wife which were used in almost all online news articles and syndicated internationally. The family's Facebook accounts were essentially closed down very quickly as the majority of their previous posts were no longer publicly viewable.
      • Recommendation: A review of what is publicly viewable on your Facebook account should be evaluated from the perspective of if an unfortunate event or your demise occurs.

       

      Caribbean Travels

      • The news media accounts of AQUA LOBO's travels indicated they had taken possession of the trawler in Stuart, Florida, United States in December 2016. They had spent two years sailing around the Caribbean and had traveled to the Bahamas and the Dominican Republic. They spent up to 6 months at the island of Bocas del Toro, Panama, then traversed the Guna Yala region, Panama on their way to the port of Cartagena, Colombia for boat repairs. After the repairs were completed they traveled back through the Guna Yala region, Panama bound for the Panama Canal. (New Zealand's Otago Daily Times 8 May 2019) They had forecasted a May departure from Panama bound to French Polynesia as part of the 2019 Pacific Puddle Jump fleet.
      • The CSSN Total 10+ Year database from 2017 to present identifies over 450 "reported" incidents in the Caribbean area they monitor. It is important to recognize that the CSSN database does not include all incidents, only those that were reported to them. It is almost inconceivable that AQUA LOBO was not aware of some of these incidents as a result of their socialization with other cruisers. But awareness does not equate into precautionary actions for many cruisers. Other experienced cruisers they met most likely provided recommendations for destinations to visit and others to avoid.
      • It is common for "experienced" cruisers to issue recommendations for destinations based on their prior travels. Many of these "experienced" cruisers venture blissfully and naively forth without any to very little consideration of safety and security precautions and were "lucky" nothing adverse happened - the odds were with them. The ones the odds were not with are likely a statistical record in CSSN's database. It is advisable when a recommendation is provided to attempt to discover if the recommendation was based on the "experience of nothing bad happened" versus the "experience and wisdom of using prudent precautionary practices".  Ask a few followup questions about how risky the area is or what precautions they used or recommend, it will be readily apparent when vague, non-specific, generalized answers are provided, no answer is provided, or the subject is abruptly changed. Nonetheless, in the final decision on a destination and its risks, the choice and responsibility is solely yours.

       

      Panamanian Government and Guna Yala Congress Animosity & Other Realities 

      • The director of Senafront, Eric Estrada, argued that in some communities (Guna Yala), the county authorities do not allow the presence of Senafront personnel, which makes the work difficult. (Spanish TVN website 3 May 2019) The Senafront "work" was the investigation of the AQUA LOBO tragedy.
      • Stated opinion of Hellen Concepción, of TVN Canal 2, "Apparently, the situation is not very complex, when the local authorities (Guna Yala) do not allow the Panamanian authorities, the police, the border authorities, SENAN and the Public Ministry to enter the island to carry out the corresponding reviews ." (General Congress of Guna Yala 3 May 2019)
      • The Guna Yala Congress spokesperson issued a formal statement contesting these statements as "totally false". (General Congress of Guna Yala 3 May 2019)
      • In the Guna Yala Congress spokesperson response it was also revealed that six Guna Yala communities have requested that SENAFRONT establish a presence in their areas to assist in the fight against illegal activities, especially drug trafficking, but these requests have not been fulfilled.
      • The Guna Yala Comarca (territory) is autonomous and independently ruled, but it is still part of Panama. The implication of this tenuous political relationship is the Guna Yala region is not "policed" to levels in other parts of Panama. It also implies emergency response from a capable authority will likely take additional time and political coordination.
      • The closeness of the Guna Yala territory to Colombia means that transshipment of drugs heading north does occur here, and where there is drug traffic you have weapons and crime. Must Read (dated).  Read - USCG Seizes Cocaine off Guna Yala.   Read Narco Boats San Blas.  Read - darker side behind Kuna Yala.
      • Seven foreigners have died violently in the first four months of 2019 in Panama. The death of Alan Culverwell brings the total to eight, as the first foreign yacht tourist killed in the Guna Yala region. (Midiario.com 3 May 2019)

       

      Within a very short 2-3 days of the AQUA LOBO tragedy, a opinion piece was syndicated on SAILfeed magazine (Now deleted - see original blog) titled, "Murder in paradise: Is cruising dangerous?". Please take the time to read it before continuing to read further here and formulate your own opinion first.

      At the same time of its syndication, it was posted and shared to many Facebook accounts and websites. As it pertained to the AQUA LOBO tragedy, I reviewed many of the shared versions and the readership commentary with scrutiny. The majority of the readership commentary expressed accolades of the articles content and author, condolences and sympathies for the AQUA LOBO family, but very few comments stated any precautionary actions that should be learned from this tragedy to minimize a similar future incident to themselves or others.  The very few comments of this nature on social media sites, expressed very tactfully and respectfully, were rebuffed with such vitriol and derogatory comments, that in a high percentage of the cases it resulted in the deletion of the original comment and subsequent threads, or the entire post by site moderators - a de facto successful censorship campaign by fellow "concerned" and "like-minded" cruisers. The end result was the suppression of discussions that potentially could have educated and propagated rational safety and security precautions to minimize risks for current and future cruisers - an equally tragic loss for the entire sailing community.

      Despite the CSSN motto “Know Before You Go” and sound recommended advice to review their documented incidents with an eye toward “what if this had happened to me? What would/should I have done, either before, during or after the event.”, there are "experienced" cruisers that foster and promote a very different viewpoint to the determent of the sailing community - one of many is shown in picture below.

        When a tragic sailing event occurs and it is investigated by professionals the published report assigns fault where found and recommendations to minimize risks of future occurrences. This same attitude should be fostered by all in the sailing community, but it is not.  There must be a difference between "professional" and "experienced" sailors/cruisers.

        The following deadly tragedies have links to their final reports that are worth reviewing. Some of the findings are very applicable to a cruising yacht; like the wear of a PFD, maintaining a constant watch, use of VHF radios, the importance of weather forecasts, etc. The key of these reports is to learn from what happened to reduce the chance of it happening again, especially to your crew, family, and yourself.

         

        As to the content of the SAILfeed magazine article (Now deleted - see original blog) titled, "Murder in paradise: Is cruising dangerous?"..

        • Its main theme posed in the title: "Is cruising dangerous?" is answered close to the end of the article, "Cruising isn’t dangerous." I found this assertion to be ludicrous. Cruising like anything in life is dangerous. It is the recognition of danger/risks and the development of strategies to minimize those that makes sailing feasible and relatively safe.  If cruising isn't dangerous, then I wasted a lot of money on safety equipment like, EPIRBs, life rafts, PFDs, flares, safety/security precautions, seaworthiness modifications, etc. One of the concluding statements of the 1979 Fastnet race inquiry sums up the risk recognition/mitigation philosophy better than I could ever state: "The sea showed that it can be a deadly enemy and that those who go to sea for pleasure must do so in full knowledge that they may encounter dangers of the highest order. However, provided that the lessons so harshly taught in this race are well learnt we feel that yachts should continue to race over the Fastnet course."
        • Further the article alludes that it is irrational to question the AQUA LOBO tragedy, "An event like this may prompt some to question their cruising plans. That’s an unfortunate outcome. It’s also not a rational one." This makes absolutely no logical sense. If this statement is believable, than all should totally disregard researching and evaluating any past tragic events and just "GO" blissfully ignorant onward.
        • Despite the tragic and deadly outcome, the article puts forth the question "Did Aqua Lobo take unnecessary risks?" and answered it with, "They categorically did not!" As "one size does not fit all" in risk assessment, it is an individual choice as to what level of risk is acceptable.  A more appropriate question would be, Were adequate precautions implemented for likely risks to be encountered?  The answer to this is clearly evident in the outcome of the AQUA LOBO tragedy.
        • The article dismisses the significance of "theft events" in determining location risks with the statement, "There’s occasional petty theft, like anywhere." A theft is a "stealth" taking of property with no interaction or confrontation with the property owner.  Robbery is a direct confrontation, assault, or murder of the property owner to deprive them of their property.  An intended theft can quickly escalate to a robbery with injury and death if a direct confrontation occurs - exactly what happened to the crew on AQUA LOBO.
        • The article stated that "After one event I was taken aside and asked by a nervous parent for help understanding how we keep our family safe as cruisers." The original question was deflected with another question and a ridiculous statistical probability was stated - a specific answer about their safety practices aboard was never divulged.
        • The article did furnish four viable sources to research security concerns for the Caribbean coast of Panama with their assessment being "it is a safe area with no pattern of violent crime against cruising boats. Zero." Strangely, right before this paragraph, they show a picture of the CSSN's Know Before You Go Interactive Infographic Risk Assessment Tool Map that contains a lot of yellow incident flags.
        • Sadly, the article did not but forth even one specific constructive precautionary concept or idea to mitigate or minimize risk to reduce the chances of a similar event occurring in the future to another fellow cruiser - which will undoubtedly happen again.

         

        As the article stated, "We anchored near the place they were attacked.", reviewed their previous posts related to their Guna Yala travels.

        • The sensible concept of "safety in numbers" or "buddy boating" was very apparent during their travels in the Guna Yala region as they traveled with another yacht(s) (Utopia II & Aseka) - whether this was purposely done as a safety measure or not is unknown. As AQUA LOBO was alone when the tragic incident occurred, the "buddy boating" practice could have been put forth in the article as a viable safety and security precautionary practice and if it was utilized, could have dramatically reduced the chances of a theft even being considered by a criminal element. 
        • Further review revealed they met a Guna Yala who spoke reasonable English due to previous time spent in Panama City. The Guna Yala population migration back and forth between larger Panamanian cities is significant and increasing, as Guna Yala individuals seek more educational and lucrative opportunities. Returnees are also a contributing factor to the increase of diseases (HIV), drug use, criminal activity, etc. in the Guna Yala region. As travel advisories indicate Panama City, Colon, and Chiriqui province have the highest crime rates it would be naive to assume that the same criminal traits are not present in the Guna Yala region due in part to the migration of the population.
        • It was revealed they provided transport of a Guna Yala family and their possessions (coconuts, plantains, and more), to include a "shotgun", despite their staunch anti-gun philosophy. As local knowledge is prized, it was disappointing to not have inquired as to the rationale of the shotgun's importance and intended use. It was also coincidental and ironic as a "shotgun" was reported as used in the AQUA LOBO tragic incident. As the transport provided was a innocent and charitable act, it could have equally been misconstrued as in violation of the Guna Yala Congress regulations that prohibit the charter of a foreign yacht (article 36.c) and carriage of firearms (article 36.d) and under unscrupulous circumstances, used as a means of entrapment.
        • They identified and recognized a disparity when they stated, they learned about the "divide" between Guna who can afford outboards for their canoes range further from the settlement islands to peddle molas. The primary item stolen from AQUA LOBO, as reported in the news media and documented on the CSSN incident report, was a unsecured outboard motor. The statement in the article, "There’s chatter in cruising circles about growing discord between the “have” and “have nots” of the world; not sure I buy into that here." contradicts their direct earlier observations.

         

        Final Thoughts

        As mentioned previously, professional investigations assign fault where found and provide preventative recommendations; so who is at "fault" or shares responsibility for this tragic incident?

        • Ultimate fault lies 100% with the three Guna Yala indigenous criminals that perpetrated this criminal act.

         

        The decision to anchor alone in a secluded anchorage; the decision to not secure outside equipment; the decision to not install access point intrusion alarms/lights; the decision for the wife and daughter to not immediately seek safe shelter; the decision of the husband to not avoided a direct confrontation with the intruders; the decision to not have emergency contact protocols; the decision to not have a comprehensive response plan; these decisions are all the responsibility and choices of AQUA LOBO.

        One could easily assign fault to AQUA LOBO based on their decisions - I can not. Why? "Experience", the experience of something bad happening.

        The aftermath of the HOV marina terrorist kidnapping resulted in a meeting with all the foreign cruisers, HOV marina owners, police, Army, Coast Guard representatives, etc. to discuss what happened and what was to be improved upon. The POINT - no one expected this to happen, so no precautions were ever put in place beforehand. Now that something tragic had happened, recommendations on changes were in abundance.  This was a group of very long-time, experienced, knowledgeable cruisers and smart professional officials and ALL were caught unprepared.

        I naively apply this same rationale to AQUA LOBO, they didn't expect this to happen, so no precautions were ever put in place beforehand. It is possible they were unaware of the CSSN website and recommendations; as there are many cruisers I have met that never heard of them. It is possible all the other cruisers they met in their travels never mentioned CSSN or the importance of safety and security precautions. It is possible most of the other cruisers they met, acquaintances, and friends recommended destinations but never mentioned or emphasized the importance of any safety and security precautions. Both the SailFeed and Latitude 38 magazine articles on this incident advocate “to not change your plans” to visit the Guna Yala region and both mention nothing about using prudent safety and security precautions despite the recent tragedy.

        So with this in mind, I assign fault to the sailing community as a whole; yes, that also means you and me, for not adequately communicating the importance of preparation for incidents like this. All of us are doing a disservice to fellow cruisers by not stressing the importance of safety and security precautions. Each time we rationalize the chance of a criminal event occurring is so remote, we inadvertently propagate a false sense of security and inaction.  The chance of sinking your boat at sea is significantly less than the chance of a criminal event occurring aboard, yet the importance of having an EPRIB, liferaft, and signal flares aboard is taken more seriously than prudent safety and security precautions. Why?

        What can the sailing community and all of us do? Spread the word, stress the importance of prudent safety and security precautions.

        • First, make sure you, your crew, your family, and your boat are prepared.
        • Add your experience and recommendations to the CSSN website.
        • Write about and share your safety and security precautions and your response plan on your social media.
        • Check if the marina you are at has a emergency contact list posted for all cruisers, if not, make one and post it.
        • At the next cruiser gathering, pot luck, barbecue, etc. inquire about the safety and security subject and experience others have had.
        • Ask others if they have or even know what a Response Plan is.
        • When a criminal event occurs, advise the unfortunate to file an incident report with CSSN and/or IMB PRC.

         

        Be Prepared For The Worst, But Expect The Best.  And above all, “Know Before You Go”.

         

        SV Dove & Abbott Family

        Archives

        SV Dove’s Past Travels

        Related Posts